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Abstract
Stochastic games are two-player repeated games in which a state variable follows a
Markov chain controlled by both players. The model was initially proposed by Shapley
(1953) who proved the existence of the discounted values. In spite of the great interest
that it generated, the convergence of the values was proved more than 20 years later,
by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976). A characterization has been missing since then. In
this paper, we provide one.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic games are repeated games in which a state variable follows a Markov chain
controlled by both players and where players receive payoffs at every stage. The play-
ers maximize a discounted sum of these payoffs, where the discount factor stands for
their impatience. See Sorin [13, Chapter 5], for a reference on this topic.
The model was initially proposed by Shapley [12] in the 50’s in a finite and zero-sum
framework, that is, the set of states K and the sets of actions I and J at every state are
finite. In this seminal paper, the author proved that the stochastic game with discount
factor λ has a value for each initial state, and that the vector of values vλ ∈ R
K is the
unique fixed point of a contracting operator Φ, that is vλ = Φ(λ, vλ). In the late 70’s,
the convergence of the values was established by Bewley and Kohlberg [3] using the
so-called algebraic approach, which relies on a deep result from real algebraic geometry,
the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem. Building on this approach, Mertens and
Neyman [8] established a few years later that the uniform value exists, meaning that
the players can guarantee the limit value in a very robust manner. More precisely, the
players can play well, and approximately obtain this limit, even if they do not know
the discount factor, provided that it is sufficiently low and that they observe their past
payoffs. An alternative approach was recently proposed by Oliu-Barton [9] to recover
these two results with linear programming and probabilistic tools.
One may argue that the sum of stage payoffs need not be a discounted sum, and
that the players may maximize their average payoff instead. It turns out that for n-
stage repeated games with average stage payoffs, the values vn also converge, and to
the same limit as discounted values. This result, due to Bewley and Kohlberg [2], was
recently extended by Ziliotto [15] to more general criteria, namely when the weights
on the stage payoffs are no longer discounted nor constant, but (almost) arbitrary. In
other words, no matter how the players evaluate the sequence of stage payoffs, the val-
ues converge to the same limit, as their impatience goes to 0. Yet, a characterization
for this common limit was missing so far.
Up to date, only a restricted family of stochastic games is well understood, the so-
called absorbing games. In these games, all states except the initial one are absorbing,
so that the state changes (at most) once and for all. The best well-known example of
these games is the Big Match, introduced by Gillette in the late 50’s and solved by
Blackwell and Ferguson [5]. Absorbing games are attractive because of their greater
simplicity: they can be represented by two matrices, one for the payoffs and another
one for the probabilities of absorption. For this reason, in spite of being a relatively
small class within the set of stochastic games, their study has deserved lots of attention.
In particular, three characterizations have been obtained for the limit value. The first
one, due to Kohlberg [6], states that the limit value is the unique real number where
a strictly monotone function changes of sign. The function is very closely related to
the derivative of Shapley’s operator, which was later studied by Rosenberg and Sorin
[11]. The second, due to Laraki [7] expresses the limit value as the value of a matrix
game where players play some linearly perturbed strategies. In the third, due to Sorin
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and Vigeral [14], the limit value appears as the value of a matrix game played with
standard, mixed strategies, but with a special payoff function involving the median of
three numbers.
Surprisingly, some of the ideas that Kohlberg [6] introduced in the very specific
context of absorbing games, are still useful in the general case. The key idea is that
the system of equations given by Shapley:
Φk(λ, vλ)− v
k
λ = 0, k ∈ K
can be transformed into an uncoupled system:
Ψk(λ, vkλ) = 0, k ∈ K
More precisely, if Gk and Qk denote, respectively, the payoff and the transition func-
tions at state k, then, whereas the k-th equation in the first system depends on
[λ,Gk, Qk, (vℓλ)ℓ], the k-th equation in the second system depends of [λ, (G
ℓ)ℓ, (Q
ℓ)ℓ, v
k
λ].
Once the system is uncoupled, one can use Kohlberg’s approach to characterize the
limit values, state by state.
Our first contribution consists in characterizing vkλ alone, for each k, as the unique
real number z satisfying Ψk(λ, z) := val(W k(λ, z)) = 0, where W k(λ, z) is an explicit
IK × JK matrix game given below. The second and main contribution of this paper is
a characterization of the limit values limλ→0 v
k
λ as the unique point where the following
strictly decreasing function changes of sign:
F k(z) := limλ→0
Ψk(λ, z)
λn
where n = |K| is the number of states.
Section 2 is devoted to present the model and main results. Section 3 to their
proofs. In Section 4 we give some comments and concluding remarks.
2 Model and main results
Our paper provides a characterization for the discounted values of finite zero-sum
stochastic games, and of their limits. As already pointed out in the introduction, the
limit is common to discounted and n-stage games, and even to more general averaging
criteria, as the weights of each stage vanish.
2.1 Standard stochastic games
Stochastic games are described by a 5-tuple Γ = (K, I, J, g, q), where K is the set of
states, I and J are the action sets of Player 1 and 2 respectively, g : K × I × J → R
is the payoff function and q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function. For each
finite set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X.
We assume throughout the paper that K, I and J are finite sets, and K = {1, . . . , n}.
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2.1.1 The stochastic game Γkλ
For any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and any k ∈ K, the λ-discounted game with initial
state k is denoted by Γkλ and proceeds as follows: at every stagem ≥ 1, knowing the cur-
rent state km, the players choose simultaneously and independently actions im and jm.
Player 1 receives the stage payoff g(km, im, jm), and Player 2 receives −g(km, im, jm).
Then, a new state km+1 is drawn according to the probability q(· | km, im, jm) and
communicated to both players. Player 1 maximizes the expectation of a λ-discounted
average of the stage payoffs, i.e. the expectation of:∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
Definition 2.1 A stationary strategy for Player 1 is a mapping x : K → ∆(I).
Similarly, a stationary strategy for player 2 is a mapping y : K → ∆(J). Similarly,
the set of stationary strategies for player 2 is ∆(J)K .
The sequence (k1, i1, j1, ..., km, im, jm, ...) generated along the game is called a play.
We denote by Pkx,y the unique probability measure on the set of plays (K × I × J)
N
induced by a couple (x, y) ∈ ∆(I)K × ∆(J)K The expectation with respect to this
probability is denoted by Ekσ,τ , and the expected payoff by:
γkλ(x, y) := E
k
x,y
[∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
]
In order to solve the game, Shapley [12] introduces the following.
Definition 2.2 For each k ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1] and u ∈ RK , the local game Gk(λ, u) is
the I × J-matrix game with payoff:
ρ(i, j) := λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
ℓ∈K
q(ℓ|k, i, j)uℓ
Definition 2.3 For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and u ∈ RK , the Shapley operator Φ(λ, · ) : RK →
RK is defined as:
Φk(λ, u) = val(Gk(λ, u)), ∀k ∈ K
Shapley [12] established that the stochastic game Γkλ has a value which satisfies:
vkλ = max
x∈∆(I)K
min
y∈∆(J)K
γkλ(x, y) = min
y∈∆(J)K
max
x∈∆(I)K
γkλ(x, y)
Moreover, the vector of values is the unique fixed point of Shapley’s operator, and both
players have optimal stationary strategies xλ and yλ. Also, a stationary strategy is
optimal in Γkλ for all k ∈ K if and only its k-th coordinate is an optimal mixed strategy
in the local game Gk(λ, vλ) for all k ∈ K. We will refer to these strategies as being
optimal in Γλ.
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2.2 Main results
The main result of this paper is a characterization of limλ→0 vλ ∈ R
K . Our charac-
terization is uncoupled in the sense that for each initial state k ∈ K, limλ→0 v
k
λ is
characterized separately. A key element in our proof is an uncoupled characterization
of vkλ for a fixed discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1]. In order to state our results, we need to
introduce n+1 auxiliary matrices ∆0,∆1, . . . ,∆n of size |I|n×|J |n, obtained from the
following matrix which gathers all the data of the game:
M(λ) :=

λG1 (1− λ)Q1,1 − U (1− λ)Q1,2 . . . (1 − λ)Q1,n
λG2 (1− λ)Q2,1 (1− λ)Q2,2 − U . . . (1 − λ)Q2,n
...
...
...
. . .
...
λGn (1− λ)Qn,1 (1− λ)Qn,2 . . . (1− λ)Qn,n − U

where for each k, ℓ ∈ K we denote by Qk,ℓ and G
k the following I × J-matrices:
Qk,ℓ := (q(ℓ|k, i, j))i,j and G
k := (g(k, i, j))i,j
and where U stands for a I × J matrix of 1’s. The introduction of these matrices is
inspired from the theory of multi-parameter eigenvalue problems (see Atkinson [1], for
a reference on this topic).
Definition 2.4
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1] we define the matrix:
∆0λ := det⊗

(1− λ)Q1,1 − U (1− λ)Q1,2 . . . (1− λ)Q1,n
(1− λ)Q2,1 (1− λ)Q2,2 − U . . . (1− λ)Q2,n
...
...
. . .
...
(1− λ)Qn,1 (1− λ)Qn,2 . . . (1− λ)Qn,n − U

where det⊗ stands for the determinant with respect to the Kronecker product ⊗.
The definition and basic properties of these products can be found in Section 3.1.
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and each k ∈ K we define the matrix:
∆kλ := (−1)
kdet⊗

λG1 (1− λ)Q1,1 − U . . . ̂(1− λ)Q1,k . . . (1− λ)Q1,n
...
...
...
...
λGn (1− λ)Qn,1 . . . ̂(1− λ)Qn,k . . . (1− λ)Qn,n − U

where thêappearing in the k-th column indicates the omission of this column.
• For each λ ∈ (0, 1], k ∈ K and z ∈ R we define the matrix game:
W k(λ, z) := (−1)n(∆kλ − z∆
0
λ)
• For each k ∈ K and z ∈ R we define the function F k : R→ R ∪ {−∞,+∞} by:
F k(z) := lim
λ→0
val(W k(λ, z))
λn
The existence of the limits will be proved below.
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Note that W k(λ, z) is a matrix game of size |I|n× |J |n that depends only (k, λ, z) and
the data of the game. Similarly, F k depends only on k and the data of the game.
We can now state our two main results.
Theorem 2.5 For any λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K, the value vkλ of the stochastic game Γ
k
λ
is the unique z ∈ R satisfying:
val(W k(λ, z)) = 0
Moreover, for any optimal stationary strategy xλ ∈ ∆(I)
n of player 1 in Γλ, the vector
x1λ ⊗ · · · ⊗ x
n
λ ∈ ∆(I
n) is an optimal mixed strategy in W k(λ, vkλ), for all k ∈ K.
Theorem 2.6 For any k ∈ K, the values vkλ converge to the unique w
k ∈ R satisfying:{
u > wk ⇒ F k(u) < 0
u < wk ⇒ F k(u) > 0
3 The proofs
3.1 Preliminaries on Kronecker products
Let us start by recalling the definition of the Kronecker product ⊗ (or tensor product)
of two matrices and the corresponding determinant det⊗.
Definition 3.1
• The Kronecker product of the m×n matrix A and the p×q matrix B is a mp×nq
matrix defined by blocks as follows:
A⊗B =
a11B · · · a1nB... . . . ...
am1B · · · amnB

• Suppose that A11, . . . , Ann are n
2 matrices such that for each row k, Ak1, . . . , Akn
are of same size. The Kronecker determinant is defined by:
det⊗
A11 . . . A1n... . . . ...
An1 . . . Ann
 := ∑
σ∈S(n)
ǫ(σ)A1,σ(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗An,σ(n)
where S(n) stands for the set of permutations of {1, . . . , n} and ǫ(σ) is the sig-
nature of σ.
Some useful and standard properties of these products are listed below:
(K1) The product ⊗ is bilinear and associative, but not commutative.
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(K2) Let A1, . . . , An and B1, . . . , Bn some matrices such that the product AkBk is well
defined. Then:
(A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗An)(B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Bn) = (A1B1)⊗ · · · ⊗ (AnBn)
(K3) Let Ak be a I
k × Jk-matrix for each k = 1, . . . , n. Then for each entry (r, s) of
(A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗An) there exists a unique (i1, j1, . . . , in, jn) ∈ I
1 × J1 × · · · × In × Jn
such that:
(A1 ⊗ · · · ⊗An)
r,s = Ai1,j11 · · ·A
in,jn
n
(K4) Let Ak be a I
k × Jk-matrix for each k = 1, . . . , n. Then for each entry (r, s) of
det⊗(A11, . . . , An,n) there exists a unique (i1, j1, . . . , in, jn) ∈ I
1×J1×· · ·×In×Jn
such that:
(det⊗(A11, . . . , An,n))
r,s = det
A
i1j1
11 . . . A
injn
1n
...
. . .
...
A
i1j1
n1 . . . A
injn
nn

(K5) The determinant det⊗ has the same properties as the usual determinant, i.e. it
is multilinear and alternating.
(K6) Let A1, . . . , An be some I × J-matrices. Then, explicitly, the relation between
(r, s) and the unique (i1, j1, . . . , in, jn) ∈ (I×J)
n of (K3) and (K4), which is the
same, is given by: {
r = (i1 − 1)|I|
n + · · ·+ (in − 1)|I|
0 + 1
s = (j1 − 1)|J |
n + · · ·+ (jn − 1)|J |
0 + 1
3.2 Characterization of the discounted values
Let us start by an elementary lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Let A = (a11, . . . , ann) be a strictly diagonally dominant n×n real matrix
satisfying akk ≥ 0 and akk−
∑
ℓ 6=k |akℓ| ≥ λ for all k = 1, . . . , n, for some λ > 0. Then
detA ≥ λn.
Proof. Let µ ∈ R satisfy µ < λ. The matrix A− µ Id is then still strictly diagonally
dominant, so that A−µ Id is invertible. It follows that all real eigenvalues of A should
be greater or equal to λ. Similarly, let µ ∈ C satisfy |µ| < λ. Again, A − µ Id is a
strictly diagonally dominant matrix, so that A−µ Id is invertible. Hence, the modulus
of every eigenvalue of A is greater or equal to λ. Let a + bi and a − bi be a pair of
conjugate non-real eigenvalues. Then
(a+ bi)(a− bi) = a2 + b2 = |a+ bi||a− bi| ≥ λ2
where the last inequality follows from our previous argument. The determinant of A,
which is equal to the product of all its eigenvalues, is thus larger than λn since the
contribution of every real eigenvalue is at least λ, and the contribution of every pair
of conjugate eigenvalues is at least λ2.
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Lemma 3.3 All the entries of (−1)n∆0λ are larger than λ
n.
Proof. Mutiplying each column of ∆0λ by −1 we obtain that
(−1)n∆0λ = det⊗

A1,1 −A1,2 . . . −A1,n
−A2,1 A2,2 . . . −A2,n
...
...
. . .
...
−An,1 −An,2 . . . An,n

for some nonnegative I × J matrices (Ak,ℓ) satisfying, for all k ∈ K:
Ak,k ≥ λU +
∑
ℓ 6=k
Ak,ℓ (3.1)
By property (K4), the (r, s)-th entry of (−1)n∆0λ is equal to the determinant, in the
usual sense, of some matrix (Ai1,j111 , . . . , A
in,jn
nn ). The condition (3.1) implies that each
of these matrices satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3.2. Hence, their determinants
are larger or equal than λn.
The following result, which is a direct consequence from Lemma 3.3, will be useful
in Section 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K:
(i) u 7→ val(W k(λ, u)) is strictly decreasing and continuous.
(ii) limu→−∞ val(W
k(λ, u)) = +∞ and limu→+∞ val(W
k(λ, u)) = −∞.
Proof. (i) The continuity follows from the continuity of the map u 7→ W k(λ, u) and
the continuity of the value operator. Now, fix u1 < u2. By Lemma 3.3, the matrix
(−1)n∆0λ has all its entries bigger than λ
n. Hence, for each (r, s) the entry W kr,s(λ, u1)
satisfies:
(W k(λ, u1))r,s − (W
k(λ, u2))r,s = (u2 − u1)(−1)
n(∆0λ)r,s ≥ (u2 − u1)λ
n > 0
This inequality implies the desired result. (ii) The boundedness of ∆kλ and Lemma
3.3 imply limu→−∞W
k(λ, u) = +∞U and limu→+∞W
k(λ, u) = −∞U . The result
follows then from the continuity of the value operator.
The next lemma will be useful in the sequel, namely to prove Proposition 3.6. It
establishes a crucial link between the expected payoff induced by a couple of stationary
strategies γkλ(x, y) and the matrices ∆
k
λ and ∆
0
λ introduced earlier, for each k ∈ K.
Notation. For any x ∈ ∆(I)K , define its injection x ∈ ∆(IK) as follows:
x = x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ xn
Similarly, y ∈ ∆(JK) denotes y := y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ yn for any y ∈ ∆(J)K .
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Lemma 3.5 For any λ ∈ (0, 1], k ∈ K, and (x, y) ∈ ∆(I)K ×∆(J)K one has:
γkλ(x, y) =
t
x∆kλy
t
x∆0λy
Proof. Let k ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1) and (x, y) be fixed throughout the proof. Let Pxy
and gxy be, respectively, the Markov chain and the vector of payoffs induced by (x, y).
That is, for each ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ K:
P ℓ,ℓ
′
xy =
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
xℓ(i)yℓ(j)q(ℓ′|ℓ, i, j) and gℓxy =
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
xℓ(i)yℓ(j)g(ℓ, i, j)
Let γ(x, y) = ((γℓλ(x, y))ℓ∈K be the vector of expected payoffs for all possible initial
states. By stationarity, one has:
γλ(x, y) = λgxy + (1− λ)Pxyγλ(x, y)
Hence, denoting by [co(M)]ℓ,ℓ
′
the (ℓ, ℓ′)-th cofactor of M one has:
γkλ(x, y) =
λ
∑n
ℓ=1 g
ℓ
xy[co((Id−(1− λ)Pxy)]
ℓ,k
det(Id−(1− λ)Pxy)
where the denominator is strictly positive because Id−(1− λ)Pxy has a strictly dom-
inant diagonal. On the other hand, using (K2) (applied twice) and the fact that
t
xℓUyℓ = 1 for each ℓ = 1, . . . , n one has:
t
x∆0λy = det⊗

t
x1((1− λ)Q1,1 − U)y
1 . . .
t
x1(1− λ)q1,ny
1
...
. . .
...
txn(1− λ)Qn,1y
n . . . txn(1− λ)Qn,ny
n

= det
(1− λ)P
1,1
xy − 1 . . . (1− λ)P
1,n
xy
...
. . .
...
(1− λ)Pn,1xy . . . (1− λ)P
n,n
xy − 1

= (−1)n det(Id−(1− λ)Pxy)
where the (−1)n comes from multiplying the matrix by −1. Similarly:
t
x∆kλy = (−1)
kdet

λg1xy (1− λ)P
1,1
xy − 1 . . .
̂
(1− λ)P 1,kxy . . . (1− λ)P
1,n
xy
...
...
...
...
...
λgnxy (1− λ)P
n,1
xy . . .
̂
(1− λ)Pn,kxy . . . (1− λ)P
n,n
xy − 1

= (−1)k
n∑
ℓ=1
(−1)ℓ+1λgℓxy(−1)
k+ℓ[co((1− λ)Pxy − Id]
ℓ,k
= (−1)nλ
n∑
ℓ=1
gℓxy[co(Id−(1− λ)Pxy]
k,ℓ
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Proposition 3.6 Let λ ∈ (0, 1] and let xλ ∈ ∆(I)
K be an optimal stationary strategy
of player 1 in Γλ. Then, for all k ∈ K, the mixed strategy xλ := x
1
λ⊗· · ·⊗x
n
λ ∈ ∆(I
K)
guarantees 0 in the matrix game W k(λ, vkλ).
Proof. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1] and k ∈ K, and let xλ ∈ ∆(I)
K be an optimal stationary
strategy. Let y ∈ Jn denote a pure stationary strategy and y = y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ yn, which
by (K6) is a vertex of ∆(Jn). By Lemma 3.5, one has:
(−1)n txλ∆
k
λy
(−1)n txλ∆
0
λy
≥ vkλ
As (−1)n tx∆0λy > 0 thanks to Lemma 3.3, by linearity one has:
t
xλ
(
(−1)n(∆kλ − v
k
λ∆
0
λ)
)
y ≥ 0
which proves the result.
Corollary 3.7 For all k ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1], val(W k(λ, vkλ)) = 0.
Proof. It follows directly by exchanging the roles of the players.
Theorem 2.5 follows directly from Proposition 3.6, Corollary 3.7 and Lemma 3.4. 
3.3 Characterization of the limit values
Lemma 3.8 For each k ∈ K, the function F k defined in Definition 2.4 is well-defined.
Moreover, there exists a unique wk ∈ R satisfying:{
u > wk ⇒ F k(u) < 0
u < wk ⇒ F k(u) > 0
Proof. Fix u ∈ R. Let us start by proving that
val(W k(λ, u))
λn
has a limit in R ∪ {−∞,+∞}. The entries of W k(λ, u) are polynomials in λ. Hence,
for each λ ∈ (0, 1], its value is a rational fraction R(λ) corresponding to some Shapley-
Snow kernel. For each λ there are finitely many possible rational fractions satisfying
val(W k(λ, u)) = R(λ), since there are finitely many Shapley-Snow Kernels. As the
λ 7→ val(W k(λ, u)) is continuous, it can only change to one rational fraction to another
at the points where the two meet. Yet, as two different rational fractions can only
intersect finitely many times, there exists λ0 > 0 and a rational fraction R0 such that
val(W k(λ, u)) = R0(λ), ∀λ ∈ (0, λ0)
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The existence of the limit follows. Now, let u1 < u2. Thanks to Lemma 3.3, for each
entry (r, s) on has:
(W k(λ, u1))r,s − (W
k(λ, u2))r,s = (u2 − u1)(−1)
n(∆0λ)r,s ≥ (u2 − u1)λ
n
This inequality implies:
val(W k(λ, u1))− val(W
k(λ, u2)) ≥ (u2 − u1)λ
n
Dividing by λn and taking the limit as λ goes to 0, one obtains:
F k(u1) ≥ F
k(u2) + u2 − u1
On the other hand, limu→−∞ F
k(u) = +∞ and limu→+∞ F
k(u) = −∞ by Lemma 3.4.
The result follows, since we have shown that F k is strictly decreasing in the interval
where it takes finite value.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Fix k ∈ K. By Lemma 3.8, there exists a unique wk ∈ R
such that F k(u) > 0 for all u < wk and F k(u) < 0 for all u > wk. Let ε > 0. For
u′ := wk − ε, one has F k(u′) > 0. Hence, there exists δ > 0 and λ0 > 0 such that for
all λ ∈ (0, λ0):
val(W k(λ, u′))
λn
≥ δ
Or, equivalenty, val(W k(λ, u′)) ≥ δλn > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ0). But now, on the one hand
the map u 7→ val(W k(λ, u)) is strictly decreasing for each λ, by Lemma 3.4 (i). On the
other hand, val(W k(λ, vkλ)) = 0, by Corollary 3.7. Consequently, for all λ ∈ (0, λ0):
vkλ > u
′
Taking the limits, and as ε is arbitrary, yields:
lim inf
λ→0
vkλ ≥ w
k
Similarly, taking u′′ := wk + ε yields lim supλ→0 v
k
λ ≤ w
k, which concludes the proof.
4 Comments and concluding remarks
4.1 Absorbing games
For the class of absorbing games, our characterization coincides with that of Kohlberg
[6]. Suppose that Γλ = (K, I, J, g, q) is an absorbing game, that is, that all states
except 1 are absorbing, i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ I × J and all k 6= 1 one has q( · |k, i, j) = δk.
Let G1(λ, u) be the local game at state 1 (see Definition (2.2)) and let:
T (u) := lim
λ→0
val(G1(λ, u))− u
λ
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Theorem 4.1 (Kohlberg 1974) The limit value of Γ1λ is the unique real w satisfying:{
u > w ⇒ T (u) < 0
u < w ⇒ T (u) > 0
Suppose w.l.o.g. that the players have one action at state k 6= 1, and let gk be its
payoff. Then:
M(λ) :=

λG1 (1− λ)Q1,1 − U (1− λ)Q1,2 . . . (1− λ)Q1,n
λg2 0 −λ . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
λgn 0 0 . . . −λ

and ∆0λ and ∆
1
λ satisfy:
(−1)n∆0λ = λ
n−1(U − (1− λ)Q1,1)
(−1)n∆1λ = λ
n−1(λG1 + (1− λ)Q1,2g2 + · · · + (1− λ)Q1,ngn)
where U is a I × J matrix of 1’s. The game W (λ, z) reduces then to:
W 1(λ, z) = (−1)n(∆1λ − z∆
0
λ)
= λn−1(λG1 + (1− λ)Q1,1z + · · ·+ (1− λ)Q1,ngn − zU)
= λn−1(G1(λ, z) − zU)
Consequently:
F 1(z) := lim
λ→0
val(W 1(λ, z))
λn
= lim
λ→0
val(G1(λ, z)− zU)
λ
= lim
λ→0
val(G1(λ, z)) − z
λ
= T (z)
which shows that our characterization is the same as the one obtained by Kohlberg,
for absorbing games.
4.2 The auxiliary games
Let us provide some remarks on the games W k(λ, z). First of all, note that from
Lemma 3.5 one can derive the following alternative expression for vkλ as the value of
the following one-shot game:
vkλ = valx,y
tx∆kλy
tx∆0λy
played either over ∆(IK) and ∆(JK), or over the subsets ∆(I)K and ∆(J)K , with the
natural inclusion of ∆(R)S to ∆(RS) given by a : ∆(R)S 7→ a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ aS ∈ ∆(RS).
As already noticed by Shapley [12], xλ ∈ ∆(I)
K is an optimal stationary strategy
in Γkλ, for all k ∈ K, if and only if x
k
λ is an optimal mixed strategy in the local game
Gk(λ, vλ), for all k ∈ K. Thus, one can determine an optimal stationary strategy xλ
provided that one knows the vector of values vλ, and vice versa. Our approach, which
has the novelty of proposing un uncoupled system, has the following implications on
strategies.
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Lemma 4.2 If x ∈ ∆(I)K is an optimal stationary strategy in Gk(λ, vkλ), for all k ∈ K,
then x := x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ xn ∈ ∆(IK) is an optimal mixed strategy in W k(λ, vkλ), for all
k ∈ K. Conversely, if x = x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ xn ∈ ∆(IK) is an optimal mixed strategy in
W k(λ, vkλ) then x
k is a optimal stationary strategy in the local game Gk(λ, vλ).
Proof. The first statement is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.6 and Corollary
3.7. For the converse, let x = x1⊗· · ·⊗xn be an optimal mixed strategy in W k(λ, vkλ),
for some x ∈ ∆(I)K . Suppose, on the contrary, that for some k ∈ K, xk is not optimal
in Gk(λ, vkλ). For each ℓ ∈ K, define:
f ℓλ(x) := min
y∈JK
γℓλ(x, y)
the payoff guaranteed by x in Γℓλ, for all ℓ ∈ K. Clearly, f
ℓ
λ(x) ≤ v
ℓ
λ for all ℓ, so that:
fkλ (x) = min
j∈J
{
λ(
t
xkGkj) + (1− λ)
∑
ℓ∈K
(
t
xkQk,ℓj)f ℓλ(x)
}
≤ min
j∈J
{
λ(
t
xkGkj) + (1− λ)
∑
ℓ∈K
(
t
xkQk,ℓj)vkλ
}
< vkλ
where the last inequality follows from the fact that xk is not optimal in Gk(λ, vkλ). But
then x is not optimal in Γkλ so that, for some y ∈ J
K one has by Lemma 3.5:
γkλ(x, y) =
t
x∆kλy
t
x∆0λy
< vkλ
Or, equivalently, x(∆kλy− v
k
λ∆
0
λ)y < 0, contradicting the optimality of x in W
k(λ, vkλ).
In particular, Lemma 4.2 implies the following: for any k ∈ K, we can determine
an optimal mixed strategy xkλ for player 1 in the game G
k(λ, vλ), which depends on
the entire vector of values, as far as we know vkλ, and vice versa.
4.3 An example
Let us illustrate our characterization with an example, studied by Kohlberg [4]. The
state space is the set K = {1, 2, 3, 4}. In the first two states, the players have 2
actions each, the payoffs are 1 and −1 regardless of the actions, and the transitions
are deterministic and given by:
1
1 2
2
2 3
1
1
2
4
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States 3 and 4 are absorbing, with payoff 1 and −1 respectively. W.l.o.g. we suppose
that each player has one action only in these states. The data of the game is then
represented by the following matrix:
M(λ) =

λ
(
1 0
0 0
) (
− λ − 1
− 1 − 1
) (
0 1− λ
1− λ 0
) (
0 0
0 1− λ
) (
0 0
0 0
)
−λ
(
1 0
0 0
) (
0 1− λ
1− λ 0
) (
− λ − 1
− 1 − 1
) (
0 0
0 0
) (
0 0
0 1− λ
)
λ 0 0 −λ 0
−λ 0 0 0 −λ

The situation is similar for both non-absorbing initial states, so let us examine the
initial state 1 only. Taking the appropriate Kronecker determinants, we obtain:
∆0λ = λ
2

λ2 λ λ 2λ− λ2
λ λ 2λ− λ2 1
λ 2λ− λ2 λ 1
2λ− λ2 1 1 1

∆1λ = λ
2

λ2 λ −λ(1− λ) 0
λ λ 0 −(1− λ)2
−λ(1− λ) 0 λ(1− λ) 1
0 −(1− λ)2 1− λ 1− λ

Recall that W 1(λ, z) = (−1)n(∆1λ − z∆
0
λ) for any (λ, z) ∈ (0, 1] × R, so that
W 1(λ, z) = λ2

λ2(1− z) λ(1− z) −λ(1− λ)− λz −(2λ− λ2)z
λ(1− z) λ(1− z) −(2λ− λ2)z −(1− λ)2 − z
−λ(1− λ)− λz −(2λ− λ2)z λ(1− z)− λz 1− λ− z
−(2λ− λ2)z −(1− λ)2 − z 1− λ− z 1− λ− z

For z = 0, we have W 1(λ, 0) = ∆1λ. A calculation
1 gives val(W 1(λ, 0)) = 2λ4 + o(λ4)
so that F 1(0) = 2. For z > 0, it is enough to check that player 2 can guarantee a
payoff smaller or equal than −2zλ7/2 + o(λ7/2), so that F 1(z) = −∞ for all z > 0.
A symmetric argument shows that player 1 can guarantee −2zλ7/2 + o(λ7/2) for any
z < 0, so that:
F 1(z) =

+∞ if z < 0
2 if z = 0
−∞ if z > 0
By Theorem 2.6, limλ→0 v
1
λ = 0.
4.4 Remarks
1. From our approach, one can infer the following upper bound for the speed of
convergence of the values:
|vkλ − w
k| = O(λ1/N )
1We have preferred to omit the details, which are a bit tedious.
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where N = min(|I|, |J |)|K0| and K0 ⊂ K is the subset of non-absorbing states.
This bound is tight for absorbing games, and is substantially better than the
previous known bound N = (|I||K|)|I||K|/2, obtained in [9].
2. The term (−1)n in the definition of W k(λ, z) is, of course, of little importance.
We chose to include it in order to ensure that ∆0λ is positive and thus, F
k is
decreasing, independently of the number of states. Also, this way we recover the
characterization for absorbing games.
3. The function F k is intriguing. It is decreasing, has slope smaller than −1 on the
interval where it takes finite values, the sign of F k(wk) is equal to the sign of
vkλ −w
k, but we do not know under which circumstances this interval reduces to
a singleton, as is the case in our example.
4. Theorem 2.6 implies the following: for any two states k and ℓ, wk = wℓ if and
only if F k(z)F ℓ(z) ≥ 0 everywhere, except at most one point.
5. A better understanding of the crucial matrices ∆0λ,∆
1
λ, . . . ,∆
n
λ would be very
useful. Namely, what is the connection between these matrices and the ergodic
structure of the chain ?
6. Recently, Oliu-Barton and Ziliotto [10] proved that stochastic games satisfy the
constant payoff property, that is, under optimal play, the cumulated payoff grows
linearly during the game. One naturally expects a deep connection between the
characterization above and this strong property.
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